The Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads and Volume in Options Markets During the Competition for Listings in 1999
In announcements had shifted 37 percent of all equity option volume from single-to multipleexchange trading. Prior to this effort, some active options were multiple listed (e.g., America
Online, Yahoo, and Amazon), but the majority of options and option volume were from singleexchange listings. These events present a unique opportunity to examine how increased competition in the form of new exchange entrants affects market making in options markets.
The listings campaign and other past activities by options exchanges attracted the attention of regulators. The U.S. Justice Department filed suit against the exchanges to enjoin them from "maintaining, continuing or renewing an agreement to limit competition among themselves by not listing equity options that were previously listed on another exchange." 2 In addition, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instituted administrative proceedings after it had "investigated significant issues relating to the competitiveness of the options market and the fulfillment by the options exchanges of their obligations as selfregulatory organizations." 3 The SEC release stated: "Bid-ask quotations made on respondents' markets have frequently been at the maximum allowable bid-ask spreads. The frequency of maximum spreads may indicate anticompetitive conduct." 4 These actions are reminiscent of investigations of Nasdaq market makers that evolved from Christie and Schultz's (1994) research on bid-ask spreads. A basic question in their research was whether spreads were too high on many Nasdaq stocks. 5 This study examines whether bid-ask spreads were higher when option classes were singly listed. Consistent with equity market studies by Wahal (1997) , Klock and McCormick (1999) and Boehmer and Boehmer (2002) , we find that both effective and quoted bid-ask spreads decrease after trading begins on a competing exchange. For options, spreads decrease dramatically. The average decreases in effective spreads are 31.3% and 38.7% for calls and puts, respectively, across the 28 option classes investigated in this study. This decrease is immediate, reflecting a demonstrative change in market-making activity after these announcements.
Furthermore, for most option classes this change is permanent. One year later these option classes continue to trade on multiple exchanges with effective spreads still showing significant reductions from their pre-multiple listing levels.
We investigate whether economies of scale have a role in reducing spreads with multiple listing. Multiple listing generated (at least temporarily) additional trading volume in the option markets. As Neal (1987, 1992) indicates, volume effects may confound the interpretation of multiple-listing effects. Option exchanges share common clearing facilities, so scale effects may arise because contracts purchased on one exchange may be sold on another exchange with minimal difficulty. In addition, with increased volume there is an increased flow of price information across exchanges, and this may reduce information costs to market makers. If so, we might expect spreads to reflect these lower costs.
We examine whether increased volume explains the decrease in spreads after multiple listing. Total contract volume increases for many option classes after multiple listing even though volume on the original exchange often diminishes. Consistent with Battalio, Hatch and
Jennings (2002), we find that the original exchange continues to attract the majority of order flow after entry in an option class. In time series regressions on each option class, series volume shows no consistent effect on spreads. In pooled time series and cross section regressions there is a negative volume effect, but this effect does not generally diminish the effect of multiple listing.
Confirming Neal (1987) , the pooled results suggest that the decrease in spreads following multiple listing is larger for low volume series than for high volume series.
We also investigate whether reduced hedging costs in the primary market might be responsible for the drop in option spreads. We find that option deltas and the underlying effective spread are significantly related to the size of option spreads, suggesting that the cost of hedging plays a role in setting option spreads. However, option deltas and underlying spreads change little after multiple listing, so hedging cost reductions do not appear to be related to the decrease in option spreads following multiple listing. To address this concern, we use both the NBBO and same-exchange quotes in our multiple listing tests, and find substantially similar results. Thus, the lack of an integrated market does not bias our results.
The main difference between this study and these previous efforts is that we analyze the actual listing event by comparing before and after multiple listing data. This helps to minimize any omitted variable biases that may arise with earlier studies. We also investigate the longerterm change in spreads after multiple listing to determine if these changes were permanent.
Furthermore, we show that hedging parameters are also determinants of option spreads, but cannot explain the decrease in spreads that follows multiple listing.
On the surface, these findings may not appear unusual because the number of exchanges listing an option class doubles, triples or even quadruples in our sample. However, on each exchange a large number of market makers appear to compete for order flow. For example, more than fifty PHLX market makers regularly traded Dell options before multiple listing. 7 Despite this large number of market makers, the advent of multiple listing reduced effective spreads by an average of 33% and 44% on Dell call and put options, respectively. The magnitude of the spread reductions across all option classes provides evidence that intra-exchange competition is not a good substitute for inter-exchange competition, evidence that fragmented order flow across competing markets may offer important benefits to investors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the circumstances leading up to the surge in multiple listings in August and September of 1999, and details the events in question. Section II discusses theories of bid-ask spreads in equity and option markets. Section III presents the data and filters used to form the sample. Section IV presents the empirical evidence for both short and long term changes in spreads and the effects of volume. Our conclusions are developed in Section V. 15 The details and timing of these announcements are shown in Table II .
I. MULTIPLE LISTING HISTORY
During the next week, the exchanges appeared to follow a tit-for-tat multiple listing strategy. The PHLX announced seven additional CBOE listings on August 26. The CBOE, AMEX, and PCX responded with 78 additional multiple-listing announcements the next day.
The PHLX then announced ten additional option listings on August 31, with seven PCX options among the ten.
The business press noticed that the AMEX and CBOE had failed to list each other's options in late August. 16 There was speculation that, via multiple listing, these larger exchanges sought to trade option classes they weren't able to obtain via mergers, which had been cancelled earlier that year. 17 On September 10, soon after this press speculation, the CBOE and AMEX 
II. DETERMINANTS OF OPTION SPREADS
Madhavan (2000) and Coughenour and Shastri (1999) review models of market making, which generally stress either inventory or asymmetric information costs as the main determinants of spreads. Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980) , and Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983 ) develop models of bid-ask spreads based on inventory costs and adjustments. These models predict that bid-ask spreads decrease with trading volume and increase with price (an opportunity cost of inventory) and the volatility of the security.
Copeland and Galai (1983), Kyle (1985) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (1987), Admati and Pfleiderer (1992) , Madhavan (1992) , and Foster and Viswanathan (1994), among others develop asymmetric information models of bid-ask spreads. These models predict that, on average, market makers lose to informed traders, so spreads are sufficiently wide to offset these losses. The informativeness of the order flow therefore affects spreads.
There are relatively few models of market making in option markets. Back (1993) and Biais and Hillion (1994) develop asymmetric information models. Option spreads in these models depend on how aggressively insiders trade, which is not generally observable. John, and hedging parameters, such as delta and gamma from an option-pricing model, are expected to affect option spreads. 19 An increase in delta is expected to positively affect call option spreads, as a larger delta requires a larger size hedge and greater underlying hedging costs. This is reversed for put options, as the sign of the put delta is negative. An increase in gamma is expected to positively affect spreads for both calls and puts. This is because a larger gamma requires the hedge to be rebalanced more frequently, thus raising hedging costs.
We compute the option deltas and gammas using the Black-Scholes formula at each trade price (Hull, 2002). As suggested by Cho and Engle (1999) and Kaul, Nimalendran and Zhang (2001), an option market maker that is fully hedged with the underlying security will bear the spread cost in the underlying market. We measure the relative cost of executing the underlying hedge with the daily average of the effective underlying stock spread.
To isolate the effects of multiple listing, we also control for other factors that may affect spreads. In addition to the theoretical literature cited above, the empirical literature also suggests that option spreads are a function of the option price, volume, and volatility (e.g., Harris (1994),
Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997)). We create option series volume by summing trade volume across all trades in a given option series (i.e., given strike and expiration month) on each trading day. We measure volatility with the simple daily average implied standard deviation (ISD) for the option class.
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III. DATA
We use option data from the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA), which findings extend to the other classes that were not part of these initial announcements.
We match each option trade to the best prevailing quote or NBBO across exchanges.
Because the options exchanges may not be effectively integrated into a national market system and there is no officially disseminated NBBO for options, the NBBO may not reflect the quotes actually faced by investors (see Battalio, Hatch and Jennings (2002) and Hansch and Hatheway (2001)). As a robustness check, we also match each trade on an exchange to the same exchange's prevailing quote, which is used to compute the "OWN" effective spread. Although we compute both effective and quoted spreads, our focus is on effective spreads because these are a better measure of trading costs actually paid by investors.
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A series of standard filters are applied to these data. We eliminate all records with time stamps outside of the range 9:30 AM to 4:10 PM. Canceled trades and quotes posted during trading halts are also deleted. We delete all quotes with a zero ask. We also exclude trades with an effective spread exceeding $5. We exclude trades that do not take place within five minutes of a quote, considering the quote to be stale. Lastly, we exclude longer-term and near-expiration options from the sample by selecting options that expire within the next ninety, but not within the next seven, calendar days. Long-term options are thinly traded, making inferences difficult.
Trades in very near-term options are likely motivated to avoid delivering stock on in-the-money options, adding noise to our analysis. Our days-to-expiration filter generally reduces our sample to the most actively traded series.
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To construct our sample, we average across all trades in given series on a given day. This approach reduces the effects of intra-day patterns. 24 Table III provides summary statistics for the sample with call options featured and averages for put options reported across classes. Table III reports averages for the effective spreads using quotes on the original listing exchange, effective spreads using the NBBO, quoted spreads, underlying effective spreads, and option volume.
25 Table III shows that average effective and quoted spreads decreased after multiple listing for all option classes. The effective spread decreases are dramatic for both the NBBO and original exchange calculations. The latter result suggests even an investor who was not willing (or able) to "shop around" for the best price could benefit from multiple listing.
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Without controls for other factors, the average effective spreads fell by 3.0 cents and 3.7 cents for calls and puts, respectively using the all exchange calculation. Across option classes, these changes average 31.3% and 38.7% for calls and puts, respectively. Quoted spreads fell by more than 50 percent or by more than 14 cents for calls and 16 cents for puts immediately after multiple listing. This provides the first empirical evidence that the multiple-listing competition resulted in lower option spreads. Notably, in the long-term sample, these spread averages show a slight rebound, but the change appears to be mostly permanent.
Following multiple listing, trading in an option became cheaper relative to trading the underlying stock. listing. There would be a high correlation between volume and the multiple-listing dummy variable. In the time series regression, this correlation implies that estimates of the volume and multiple listing effects may be confounded. In the pooled regression, however, the additional cross-sectional variation in volume will enhance the model's ability to capture the true effect of volume on trading costs.
Although our regressions focus on effective and not quoted spreads, we use appropriate controls for the bounds that each exchange sets on quoted option spreads. 28 These bounds vary with the option price and have the effect of censoring the quoted spread data. For instance, the bound is $1/4 for options with a bid price less than $2, and relaxes to $3/8 for prices between $2 and $5. A set of dummy variables is used to capture these differences, with the $2 to $5 range absorbed in the intercept.
We also create a multiple listing dummy variable, which equals zero before an option class begins trading on multiple exchanges and one afterwards. The coefficient on the multiplelisting dummy measures the incremental effect of multiple listing on effective spreads after controlling for economies of scale, hedging effects and other option characteristics.
A. The volume measure is particularly important because we wish to isolate any scale effects during these periods. Total daily volume in the option series across all exchanges is expected to vary inversely with effective spreads. 29 In addition, it is possible that the effect of volume on spreads changed after multiple listing (see Mayhew (2002) and Neal (1987 and 1992) ). To capture this possibility, we include an interaction term between volume and the multiple-listing dummy variable. Most of the volume coefficients are negative but only nine are significant. In addition, the interaction term is nearly always positive, which acts to offset the volume effect. Thus, the volume results are somewhat mixed for these regressions.
First Five Multiple Listed Options
We also explore other aspects of the scale economies argument for these five option classes. In results not reported, we estimate the regressions in Table IV using In general, the R-squared values are fairly high in these regressions, providing additional support for our specification and inferences about multiple listing effects. In the short-term sample, the adjusted R-squared is near or above 50% for all equations except Coca-Cola put options. In the long-term sample, the adjusted R-squared is even higher with Dell calls showing a fit of 79.7%, for example.
The models estimated in Table IV use a linear specification. Mayhew (2002) provides evidence that spreads may be nonlinearly related to several of the control variables used in these regressions, notably volume and price. To address this concern, we also estimate the regressions in Table IV (and Tables V and VI ) using a log-log specification. A negative and significant multiple listing effect was consistently present in these regressions, too. The adjusted R-squared values were similar to those in the corresponding linear regressions.
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B. Pooled Cross Section and Time Series Analysis
Volume changes between pre-and post-multiple listing may be highly correlated with the multiple-listing variable, which may confound the effects of volume and multiple listing. To reduce this correlation, we add variation to the volume series by pooling the cross section and time series data. These pooled regressions also help to identify the effects of hedging variables as these costs vary across option classes. Table V presents the pooled regression estimates of our basic model. The two panels in Table V show estimates for the short-and long-term samples, respectively. In these regressions, the intercept is allowed to vary by class, but the multiplelisting effect is not, so that a single multiple-listing estimate is available for reference. The table shows estimates based of four different specifications, plus an estimate based on an own-exchange (OWN) calculation of effective spreads. Models 1 and 2 show the sensitivity of the regression results to including the option delta, gamma and volatility terms. These variables are related in a nonlinear manner to option price, which may create multicollinearity and affect the regression results. Note that the size and significance of the coefficient on option price changes little across these specifications, which suggests that multicollinearity in not a major problem.
Models 3 and 4 show the sensitivity of the results to volatility and the series volume interaction term.
As the results in Table V contracts is significantly beyond the daily averages for the vast majority of option classes. Even at the average daily series volume for our highest volume (Dell call) options, the short-term effects of multiple listing imply a spread decrease of nearly 29%, in line with our other estimates of the multiple-listing effect.
Another implication of our reported coefficients for the volume/multiple listing interaction term is that scale economies do not explain why spreads declined after multiple listing. To illustrate this point, suppose that two series have the same average daily volume before multiple listing, and that one series experiences a sharp increase in volume after multiple listing. Because the volume/multiple listing interaction effect almost exactly negates the volume effect, the spread decrease for these series is expected to be about the same. Thus, the increase in volume after multiple listing does not generate an additional decrease in spreads, as would be the case if there were economies of scale.
Finally, the pooled results show that option price, the underlying effective spread and option delta are important determinants of option spreads. These variables are highly significant and have the expected signs, suggesting that the pure time series analysis did not provide enough variation to consistently capture the effects of these variables. In contrast to the time-series results, these findings support the view that higher hedging costs increase option spreads (see Cho and Engle (1999) and Kaul, Nimalendran and Zhang (2001) Table V implies only a small spread effect of between 0.08 and 0.10 cents. This change is not sufficient to explain the 2.7 to 3.5 cent decrease in average daily effective spreads.
C.
Multiple Listing and Volume Effects
As a final check on the robustness of our results, we estimate separate multiple listing effects for each option class. This modified pooled regression allows both the intercept and the multiple-listing effect to vary for each option class, but constrains the other variables across option classes. These regression results use the specification shown in Table V 
V. CONCLUSIONS
There are significant reductions in effective and quoted spreads after another exchange 
Fraction of Option Classes listed on:
Mid-August 1999 68% 16% 8% 4%
September 1999 64% 15% 9% 6%
August 2000 55% 23% 13% 9%
Fraction of Option Volume for listings on:
Mid-August 1999 61% 15% 17% 7%
September 1999 24% 13% 28% 35%
August 2000 15% 9% 13% 63%
Number of Exchanges Table I  Class Count and Volume for Single-and Multiple-Listed   This table shows Number Previously Traded on
The number of option classes affected by a new listing announcement are reported for the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), Pacific Exchange (PCX), and the Philadelphia Exchange (PHLX) on the announcement date. The distribution of these new listings across exchanges that already trade the option class is shown for each announcement. The dates of each announcement are taken from exchange news releases and business news services. Listing announcements in September are for options that were traded on more than one exchange, so the individual exchange counts may sum to more than the listing total. All option data are computed at an option trade and averaged over the day. The mean of the daily averages for each option class in the sample is reported for call options. The underlying spreads are also computed at each trade using the prevailing best quote to compute effective spreads. Option volume is measured in contracts (1 contract equals 100 shares of the underlying stock) and summed over all exchanges trading the option series to compute the daily average. These averages are reported for the periods before and after multiple listing (ML) in 1999, and for the August 2000 sample, separately. All spreads are reported in cents. 
Average Behavior of Option Spreads and Volume--Before and After Multiple Listing in 1999 and 2000 Samples
Table IV
This table shows estimates from regressing effective bid-ask spreads on a multiple listing dummy, option price, underlying effective spread, option delta, option gamma, volatility, series volume and series*multiple listing interaction term. These estimates are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's (1980) method. Effective spread equals 2*ABS[trade price -quote midpoint]. A trade is excluded if the option quote is older than five minutes. Option delta and gamma are computed using BlackScholes formulae. Volatility is the implied standard deviation (ISD) from Black-Scholes or the binomial model if dividends are paid and is measured in percent. Closing prices of three options are used for the ISD calculation: the closest at the money option, the strike price above and below this option. Volume is summed across all trades in the series. All variables are daily averages except series volume, which is summed over the day. The multiple listing dummy equals zero before another exchange began to list the option. Independent variables are standardized to zero mean, so the intercept represents the average effective spread before multiple listing. A "---" indicates insufficient observations on this variable. A "**" and "*" implies 99% and 95% levels of significance, respectively. This table shows regression estimates from pooling all option classes in a given sample period, separating call and put options. The estimates are corrected for heteroscedasticity using White's (1980) method. The independent variables are the same as in Table IV and are also standardized to have zero mean. Each option class is allowed a separate intercept term (not shown), but the multiple listing effect is combined across all classes to report an average impact. The "OWN" model uses the bidask spread prevailing on the listing exchange where the trade occurs. Spreads are averaged over each daily and daily averages are used in these regressions. An asterisk indicates the level of significance of each coefficient. An "**" implies 99% level of significance and "*" implies 95% level of significance. pays a dividend. The calculation is an average of the at-the-money strike, one strike above, and one strike below for series with more than 20 days to expiration. Alternatively, the standard deviation of underling stock prices using a 10-day moving average yields qualitatively similar results. 21 We drop three option classes from our sample. Chase Manhattan Bank and Monsanto were subsequently involved in mergers and not available for long-term analysis. Homestake Mining lacked sufficient long-term trading volume and short term put volume. 22 The effective spread is twice the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint. This measure will overstate true effective spreads when buyer-initiated trades are below and sellerinitiated trades are above the midpoint.
Call Options by Class Put Options by Class
Panel (A): August/September 1999 Sample
Determinants of Effective Bid-Ask Spreads for Five Option Classes in the First Announcements
Dummy ($20 < bid) --- --- --- 0.022 --- --- --- --- --- ---
